



**A Two-Dimensional Evaluative
Framework for Public Expression**
*Moral Quotient (MQ) and
Intellectual Quotient (IQ)*

Lev Neymotin, PhD
Uncompressed Thinking

N5Digital, Inc.

*We learned to measure speed, scale, reach, and influence.
We have hesitated much longer to measure the quality of what is expressed.*

Abstract

This paper extends a previously proposed framework, Moral Quotient (MQ), into a broader two-dimensional system for evaluating public expression. MQ was introduced as a disciplined moral lens directed not at private virtue or inner worth, but at observable public behavior: patterns of truthfulness, fairness, dignity, responsibility, and moral conduct within the media sphere. Yet moral quality alone does not exhaust the structure of public expression. A statement may be morally restrained yet intellectually empty; it may be cognitively sophisticated yet morally corrosive. For that reason, a second dimension is proposed here: Intellectual Quotient (IQ), defined not in the psychometric sense, and not as a claim about innate ability, but as an index of the cognitive quality of observable public reasoning.

The central argument of this paper is that public expression is better understood when treated as occupying a two-dimensional evaluative space. MQ addresses the moral character of visible public conduct. IQ addresses the cognitive quality of visible public reasoning. Together they offer a more disciplined language for analyzing the public information environment than prevailing measures of popularity, engagement, virality, credibility, or ideological alignment. The framework proposed here is not an instrument of state authority, not a basis for rights or penalties, and not a claim to total knowledge about persons. It is intended as a transparent, contestable, limited, and non-coercive framework for interpretation, analysis, and, in a later stage, voluntary private filtering.

The paper further argues that although the framework is grounded strictly in observable public expression, the relation between recurrent public behavior and the person expressing it cannot be ignored indefinitely. Repeated expression is not random. It may justify cautious, limited, and probabilistic inference about disposition, though that extension remains secondary in the present work. The primary task here is more foundational: to propose that public expression is neither morally neutral nor cognitively flat, and that society may need a clearer language for evaluating both dimensions together.

1. Introduction: Why One Axis Is Not Enough

1.1. The Limits of a Moral Lens Alone

The proposal for MQ began from a visible deficiency in contemporary public life. The public sphere is crowded with ranking systems of every kind, yet it continues to lack a disciplined language for speaking about the moral quality of public behavior. One may measure reach, influence, engagement, authority, popularity, reputation, and even trust; but none of these addresses directly what kind of moral conduct is being displayed, rewarded, or normalized in public view. MQ was introduced as an attempt to address that gap. Its purpose was not to evaluate the soul, not to assign rights, and not to formalize virtue in any theological or coercive sense. It sought, more modestly, to articulate a framework for the moral evaluation of observable public behavior.

That effort remains necessary. Yet it is not sufficient. Public expression does not fail only through cruelty, dishonesty, humiliation, recklessness, or moral asymmetry. It also fails through confusion, incoherence, intellectual laziness, pseudo-argument, theatrical complexity, and the strategic production of obscurity. One can degrade a public environment by what one permits morally. One can also degrade it by how one reasons, how one structures claims, how one handles evidence, and how one teaches others, through repeated example, to mistake performance for thought.

The earlier moral framework therefore solved one problem while leaving another exposed. It established one axis, but only one. The need for a second axis arises not because the first was weak, but because it was necessarily partial.

1.2. Public Expression Fails in More Than One Way

The contemporary public sphere is often described as angry, polarized, deceptive, tribal, or manipulative. These descriptions are real, but incomplete. Much of what degrades public discourse today is not merely moral corrosion. It is also cognitive corrosion. The degradation appears not only in lies and incitement, but in forms of expression that are chronically inflated, structurally weak, conceptually blurred, rhetorically overconfident, and resistant to disciplined scrutiny. Public life is increasingly filled with statements that do not merely misbehave. They do not think well.

The distinction matters because moral and cognitive failure do not always travel together. A person may speak with evident goodwill and still produce public confusion. Another may reason with formidable precision while using that power in the service of distortion, cynicism, or degradation. If these two kinds of failure are treated as identical, public analysis becomes flattened. If they are treated as unrelated, public analysis becomes blind to one of the defining dynamics of the age: discourse is often damaged at once by what is morally wrong and by what is cognitively unsound.

The public sphere is therefore not in need of only one evaluative vocabulary. It is in need of at least two.

1.3. From Moral Trace to Cognitive Trace

The earlier argument for MQ depended on a simple premise: morality leaves a trace in behavior. One need not claim access to a person's inner essence in order to observe recurrent public patterns of honesty or deceit, fairness or manipulation, restraint or cruelty. Public conduct makes certain moral tendencies visible, even if never exhaustively so.

A similar premise applies to the cognitive dimension. Intelligence, understood here not as an abstract inner possession but as visible cognitive quality, also leaves a trace in behavior. It appears in the shape

of reasoning, in the structure of explanation, in the handling of evidence, in the fit between claim and support, in the capacity to clarify rather than merely impress, and in the ability to refine oneself under challenge rather than retreat into noise. The claim is not that public expression reveals the total mind. It is that public reasoning, like public morality, leaves recurrent patterns open to disciplined observation.

This continuity matters. The present paper is not a departure from the behavioral logic of MQ into speculative psychology. It is an extension of that same logic into a second evaluable domain.

1.4. The Need for a Second Dimension

If moral quality can be made visible and structured in relation to public conduct, a complementary question naturally follows: how should one evaluate the cognitive quality of public expression? Not whether a statement is morally acceptable, but whether it is intellectually sound; not whether it degrades or elevates, but whether it clarifies or obscures. In a public sphere increasingly shaped by amplification rather than deliberation, this distinction becomes critical.

The central claim of this paper is therefore direct. Public expression requires at least two evaluative dimensions if it is to be understood with any adequacy: one moral and one cognitive. MQ addresses the moral character of visible public conduct. IQ addresses the cognitive quality of visible public reasoning. Together they form a two-dimensional framework through which public expression may be evaluated more clearly, more explicitly, and more honestly than is possible through current habits of ranking and labeling.

2. From MQ to a Broader Analytical Framework

2.1. The Core Contribution of MQ

MQ was proposed as a framework for evaluating the moral quality of observable public behavior. It did not claim to read private motives or pronounce upon ultimate worth. It confined itself deliberately to visible patterns: truth orientation, fairness in representation, methods of disagreement, relationship to cruelty, consistency of principle, and responsibility under influence. It argued that in an environment dominated by algorithmic amplification and weakened gatekeeping, society may need a clearer language for describing the moral structure of public expression.

Equally important, MQ was proposed under strict limits. It was not conceived as a state instrument, not as a mechanism for assigning civic rights or penalties, and not as a mandatory ranking of citizens. It was defined instead as a non-coercive, transparent, contestable, and interpretive framework. Its purpose was to help individuals and communities describe what kinds of visible public conduct are morally constructive and what kinds are morally corrosive.

That earlier contribution remains intact. The present paper does not revise it. It builds upon it.

2.2. A Brief Reconstruction of MQ

While MQ was developed in a separate work, a brief reconstruction is necessary to preserve conceptual continuity. MQ, or Moral Quotient, is not intended as a measure of inner virtue, private intention, or ultimate moral worth. It is not a score of the soul. It is a proposed evaluative framework for observable public behavior, grounded in what individuals choose to express, affirm, excuse, or normalize in the shared media environment.

The framework arises from a historical and structural observation. Earlier media systems, despite their imperfections, imposed forms of friction: editorial judgment, reputational accountability, and

recognizable boundaries between signal and distortion. In much of the contemporary media environment, that relationship has shifted. Amplification mechanisms reward speed, emotional intensity, and provocation, often allowing morally and cognitively corrosive expression to spread more efficiently than disciplined and constructive discourse. MQ is proposed as a response to that inversion: not as a corrective authority, but as a way of making visible the moral structure of what is being amplified.

MQ is therefore concerned with patterns rather than isolated acts. Its object is the recurrent moral posture displayed in public expression over time. These patterns include truth orientation, fairness in representation, method of disagreement, relationship to harm, consistency of principle, and responsibility under influence. The aim is not to extract a single verdict from a single statement, but to identify durable modes of conduct as they become visible through repetition.

Equally important are the framework's limits. MQ does not assign rights, impose penalties, or function as an instrument of state authority. It is explicitly non-coercive. It is intended as a transparent, contestable, and limited evaluative lens. In this sense, MQ is better understood as a navigational instrument than as a tribunal: a tool for orientation within the public information environment rather than a mechanism for governing it.

Finally, MQ does not claim to invent morality. It draws upon convergent elements of humanity's moral inheritance—across philosophical, religious, and civic traditions—while acknowledging that no formulation can be complete or final. It is therefore both constructed and constrained: constructed as a practical evaluative framework, and constrained by the need to remain cross-tribal, non-sectarian, and resistant to ideological capture.

It is on this basis that MQ can serve as one axis of a broader evaluative space, capable of interacting with other dimensions—most notably cognitive quality—without losing its grounding in observable public behavior.

2.3. Why MQ Was Necessarily Incomplete

The limitation of MQ was not an oversight. It was an act of restraint. The task of defining even one new evaluative language for public behavior is difficult enough without burdening it with every adjacent question at once. The moral dimension therefore stood first, not because it was the only one that mattered, but because it could be isolated and clarified as a coherent beginning.

Yet public discourse is not shaped only by moral posture. It is also shaped by how people reason, what they count as explanation, how they handle evidence, how they scale certainty, how they respond to contradiction, and whether their expression produces understanding or merely the appearance of it. The same media environment that amplifies moral degradation also amplifies cognitive weakness, rhetorical inflation, and strategic confusion. A framework that attends only to the first leaves the second unnamed.

Once one asks how public behavior is morally conducted, one is only a step away from asking how public reasoning is cognitively conducted.

2.4. The Second Question

If MQ seeks to evaluate the moral character of public behavior, a complementary question arises almost on its own: how should one evaluate its cognitive quality? The difference is not minor. A person may

avoid cruelty, show restraint, and reject humiliation, yet speak in ways that are intellectually careless, shallow, or conceptually unstable. Another may marshal arguments with considerable power while placing that intelligence in the service of moral degradation. Public life contains both figures, and often rewards both.

The need for a second lens therefore does not arise from theoretical symmetry alone. It arises because reality presents these distinctions constantly. What is visible in public is not only conduct, but reasoning. What is amplified is not only attitude, but structure. A framework capable of seeing only one of those will misdescribe the world it seeks to understand.

2.5. A Two-Dimensional Turn

MQ and IQ are not proposed here as two unrelated scores. They are two dimensions of the same object: public expression. One concerns the moral character of visible conduct. The other concerns the cognitive quality of visible reasoning. They overlap, influence one another, and sometimes appear tightly coupled. But they are not identical, and should not be collapsed into each other.

The present paper therefore represents more than the introduction of a second quotient. It proposes a two-dimensional evaluative framework within which public expression can be located, described, and compared with greater fidelity. The aim is not to replace judgment with arithmetic, but to provide a clearer language for judgment than current public discourse usually possesses.

3. The Cognitive Dimension of Public Expression

3.1. Why Cognitive Quality Must Be Evaluated Separately

A public statement may be ethically restrained and still be intellectually empty. It may avoid cruelty yet remain vague, unsupported, or confused. Conversely, a statement may be sharply reasoned, highly structured, and strategically sophisticated while serving propaganda, humiliation, or deception. These possibilities are not rare exceptions. They are routine facts of public life.

If moral and cognitive quality are fused into one vague assessment, these distinctions disappear. The morally serious but cognitively weak speaker is misread as wholly admirable. The cognitively strong but morally reckless speaker is misread in equally distorted ways. A disciplined public analysis cannot afford such flattening.

Cognitive quality therefore requires separate treatment, not because morality is secondary, but because moral judgment alone cannot tell us whether public reasoning is structurally sound.

3.2. Beyond Popularity, Engagement, and Surface Credibility

Modern public life has many ranking systems, but very few that capture cognitive seriousness. Popularity measures notice. Engagement measures activation. Influence measures spread. Credibility often reflects institutional standing, aesthetic presentation, or tribal reassurance. None of these is identical with intellectual quality. A shallow slogan may travel farther than a careful argument. A confident fraud may seem more credible than a hesitant truth-teller. A charismatic simplifier may dominate attention while contributing almost nothing to understanding.

What passes for public evaluation of intelligence is often equally crude. The label “smart” is frequently attached to speed, style, aggressiveness, novelty, or elite association rather than to clarity, coherence, proportion, and evidence handling. In such an environment, cognitive weakness is easily mistaken for

strength if it performs with sufficient energy. A dedicated evaluative language is needed precisely because the existing substitutes reward appearance more readily than substance.

3.3. What Cognitive Degradation Looks Like

Cognitive degradation in public expression has many forms. Sometimes it appears as confusion disguised as nuance, where language becomes so inflated or evasive that meaning dissolves beneath rhetoric. Sometimes it appears as overconfidence without warrant, where assertion outpaces support and certainty becomes a costume. Sometimes it appears as selective evidence, false equivalence, empty abstraction, pseudo-depth, or the performance of complexity without actual integration of thought.

At other times the degradation is more deliberate. Ambiguity is used strategically so that a statement may suggest more than it can defend. Contradictions are ignored because emotional force is doing the work that reasoning cannot. Claims are scaled to maximum effect rather than to available support. Public discourse becomes crowded with expressions that are not exactly nonsense, but are cognitively unserious in a deeper way: they do not submit themselves to the discipline of structure.

The point is not to produce a taxonomy for its own sake. It is to recognize that the cognitive failure of public discourse is not mysterious. It has forms, patterns, and recognizable traces.

3.4. Cognitive Evaluation as Public Necessity

In an earlier age, one might have treated cognitive quality as a concern for classrooms, journals, or small circles of serious readers. That distinction is harder to sustain when public life itself is mediated by platforms that scale confusion as effectively as they scale truth. In such a world, the failure to distinguish argument from simulation, explanation from performance, and reasoning from activation becomes a civic weakness rather than a private inconvenience.

A public sphere that loses the habit of cognitive discrimination becomes easier to govern through atmosphere rather than thought. It becomes more vulnerable to manipulation, more receptive to spectacle, and less capable of recognizing when it has ceased to think seriously about its own condition. Cognitive evaluation, in that sense, is not elitist ornament. It is part of public self-protection.

4. Defining IQ in the Present Framework

4.1. IQ Is Not Psychometric IQ

The use of the term IQ in this paper is deliberately narrowed and should not be confused with standard psychometric usage. The present framework does not concern intelligence testing in the educational, clinical, hereditary, or population-level sense. It does not claim to rank innate capacity, predict life outcomes, or measure total mental power. It is not a theory of human hierarchy.

The term is used here in a different and more limited way. IQ, in this paper, stands for Intellectual Quotient: an index of the cognitive quality of observable public expression. The choice of initials is not accidental, since the public will inevitably hear the echo of older uses. But the meaning is deliberately redefined. What matters here is not hidden capacity, but visible reasoning.

4.2. Intelligence Leaves a Trace in Behavior

Intelligence, like morality, leaves a trace in behavior. It leaves it not as an exhaustive revelation of the inner person, but as a recurrent pattern in what a person makes visible through expression. One sees it in the ability to make complexity graspable without falsifying it, in the capacity to hold related ideas

together without collapse, in the discipline of scaling conclusions to evidence, and in the willingness to refine rather than merely repeat under challenge.

This does not mean that every public expression is a pure window into the mind. People posture, conceal, improvise, imitate, and perform. They may speak above or below their ordinary level. Yet over time, public expression does reveal a characteristic relationship to structure. Some people repeatedly clarify. Others repeatedly confuse. Some argue with care. Others lean habitually on force of tone, prestige, or emotional pressure in place of thought. These patterns are not everything. But they are something, and they are observable.

4.3. IQ as an Index of Observable Cognitive Structure

IQ, as proposed here, is a structured index of the cognitive quality of observable public expression. It concerns not what a person could think in some private or ideal setting, but what becomes visible in public reasoning over time. Its object is recurrent cognitive structure: clarity, coherence, evidence handling, proportionality, resistance to distortion, and responsiveness to challenge.

As with MQ, the relevant unit is not the isolated utterance. It is the durable pattern. One statement, however brilliant or poor, proves little by itself. A sequence of statements, responses, corrections, evasions, explanations, and repeated habits begins to reveal a public intellectual posture. That posture is the proper object of the present framework.

4.4. What IQ Does Not Claim to Measure

IQ in this framework does not claim to measure the whole intelligence of a person. It does not claim to reveal hidden knowledge, latent ability, unexpressed talent, or private intellectual life. It does not abolish the difference between performance and capacity. A person may think better than he speaks, or speak better than he thinks. He may be distracted, strategic, ironic, imitative, or situationally constrained.

These limits do not weaken the framework. They make it more defensible. The project remains grounded in what can be publicly observed, evaluated, and contested. That is the condition under which structured evaluation becomes possible without pretending to omniscience.

4.5. On the Distribution of Cognitive and Moral Expression

While MQ and IQ have been introduced as evaluative dimensions, it is natural to ask how public expression might distribute across these dimensions in practice. A useful starting point is to consider simplified distribution curves for each.




Figure 1. Conceptual Distributions of IQ and MQ in Public Expression

The figure presents illustrative distribution curves for Intellectual Quotient (IQ) and Moral Quotient (MQ) as applied to public expression. The IQ curve is shown as approximately centered, reflecting a notional concentration of cognitive quality around a midpoint. The MQ curve is shown with asymmetry, suggesting that the moral character of public expression may be shaped by amplification dynamics and social incentives that shift its effective distribution. These curves are conceptual rather than empirical, intended to illustrate that the cognitive and moral dimensions may differ not only in kind, but also in their population-level structure. Such differences influence how expression occupies the MQ–IQ evaluative space and inform the development of a two-dimensional analytical framework.

The IQ curve, when interpreted as the cognitive quality of public reasoning, can be approximated—at least conceptually—by a familiar bell-shaped distribution centered near a midpoint. This reflects an intuitive expectation: most public expression exhibits moderate levels of cognitive structure, with fewer instances of highly disciplined reasoning on one end and fewer instances of extreme incoherence on the other. Even where asymmetry is present, the central tendency remains relatively stable, suggesting that cognitive variation, while significant, is constrained by shared linguistic, educational, and cultural baselines.

The MQ distribution, however, may not follow the same shape. If MQ reflects the moral character of public expression under conditions of amplification, incentive, and social signaling, its distribution may exhibit a different asymmetry. In particular, it is plausible that the effective center of gravity shifts away from the midpoint, reflecting the fact that public environments often reward behaviors that are morally reactive, exaggerated, or strategically imbalanced. In such a case, the distribution of MQ would not simply mirror cognitive variation, but would instead reflect the pressures exerted by the surrounding media ecosystem.

The illustrative curves in Figure 1 are therefore not empirical claims, but conceptual aids. They suggest that while cognitive quality may cluster around a relatively stable center, moral expression—especially in amplified public environments—may exhibit skew, elongation, or displacement. The two distributions are thus not only different in dimension, but potentially different in shape.

This difference matters. If MQ and IQ were distributed identically, the two-dimensional framework would collapse into a largely redundant mapping. But if their distributions diverge—even modestly—the resulting evaluative space becomes structurally richer. Certain regions of the MQ–IQ plane may become more densely populated than others. Some combinations of moral and cognitive traits may be common, while others remain rare but highly influential.

It is precisely this divergence that gives the quadrant model its analytical power. The four quadrants are not expected to be equally populated. A cognitively moderate but morally imbalanced region may dominate in certain environments. A cognitively strong but morally unstable region may contain fewer actors, yet exert disproportionate influence. A morally constructive but cognitively weaker region may be more common but less visible. And the region combining both strengths may be both rare and under-amplified.

These distributional differences are not merely descriptive. They suggest that the MQ–IQ framework operates over a structured landscape rather than a uniform field. If cognitive quality tends to cluster near a relatively stable center while moral expression is more susceptible to displacement under conditions of amplification, then the resulting evaluative space will be unevenly populated. Certain regions—particularly those combining moderate cognitive structure with moral imbalance—may become disproportionately dense, while others—such as the conjunction of high cognitive and high moral discipline—may remain comparatively rare. This asymmetry does more than explain the shape of public discourse. It provides the first operational intuition for a future filtering system. A filter acting on MQ and IQ would not be selecting from a neutral distribution, but navigating a field in which some forms of expression are structurally overrepresented and others structurally scarce. Its role would therefore not be to eliminate categories, but to restore balance within an environment whose natural dynamics tend toward distortion.

In this sense, the distributions do more than illustrate variation. They suggest that the MQ–IQ framework is not only a way of describing public expression, but also a way of understanding how that expression is unevenly produced, amplified, and encountered.

5. Candidate Dimensions of IQ

5.1. Clarity

Clarity concerns whether public expression illuminates or obscures. It does not require simplification to the point of distortion, nor does it demand stylistic plainness in every case. Rather, it asks whether complexity is made more understandable or less. A cognitively serious speaker does not hide behind fog. He may discuss difficult things, but he does so in a way that invites comprehension rather than dependence on mystique.

In public life, clarity is often underestimated because obscurity can masquerade as depth. Yet the willingness to be understood is itself a sign of intellectual seriousness. It suggests that thought is serving understanding rather than vanity, intimidation, or theatrical self-display.

5.2. Coherence

Coherence concerns whether an expression holds together as a structure. Do its examples support its claims? Do its implications align with its premises? Does it preserve continuity across its parts, or drift opportunistically from point to point? Coherence is not rigid uniformity; it is internal integrity.

A public sphere rich in opinion but poor in coherence becomes increasingly difficult to navigate because apparent thought breaks apart under attention. Coherence therefore matters not merely as a formal virtue, but as a sign that expression is governed by structure rather than impulse.

5.3. Logical Discipline

Logical discipline concerns whether conclusions actually follow from what is asserted, whether contradictions are noticed and addressed, and whether rhetoric is substituting for argument. It is not confined to formal symbolic logic. It is the broader intellectual habit of respecting inferential structure.

Public discourse often fails here in subtle ways. The force of a statement may come not from what it establishes, but from tone, repetition, moral pressure, or associative suggestion. Logical discipline asks whether the path from premise to conclusion is actually being walked, or merely claimed.

5.4. Fidelity to Evidence

Fidelity to evidence concerns how public expression treats support. Does evidence constrain the claim, or merely decorate it? Are inconvenient facts acknowledged or filtered away? Is evidence used selectively to produce the appearance of rigor while leaving the actual structure of the argument untouched?

Much of public discourse invokes evidence ceremonially. A number, a study, an expert, or an image appears and is treated as sufficient to settle what has not in fact been established. Cognitive seriousness requires more. It requires that evidence serve as discipline rather than as prop.

5.5. Proportionality

Proportionality concerns the fit between certainty and support, between scale of claim and scale of warrant, between tone and available evidence. Many public statements are not wholly false; they are disproportionate. They overstate, absolutize, dramatize, or universalize beyond what is justified. In a culture of amplification, disproportion is one of the easiest cognitive failures to reward, because it produces intensity without having to produce structure.

A cognitively serious speaker does not withhold judgment indefinitely, but he does not inflate it merely because inflation travels better.

5.6. Resistance to Distortion

Resistance to distortion concerns whether an expression remains stable when tested. Does it survive scrutiny without collapsing into ambiguity, contradiction, or strategic retreat? Does it preserve its core meaning across challenge, or is its apparent sophistication exposed as fragility once questioned?

This dimension helps distinguish real structure from polished simulation. Some statements seem impressive until one asks what exactly they mean, how exactly they are supported, or what exactly follows from them. Cognitive strength is not the ability to sound substantial. It is the ability to remain substantial when pressure is applied.

5.7. Clarification Under Challenge

One of the clearest public traces of intelligence is what happens under challenge. A person confronted with criticism may clarify, refine, qualify, deepen, or correct. He may reveal that his original statement was part of a larger, disciplined structure. Or he may evade, repeat slogans, intensify tone, attack motives, and substitute aggression for revision.

This is not a minor behavioral feature. Public reasoning is not only a finished product; it is also a way of moving through disagreement. The capacity to clarify under pressure is therefore not an accessory to intelligence in public life. It is one of its most important visible signs.

5.8. Pattern Over Performance

These dimensions are not meant to encourage theatrical scoring based on one clip, one phrase, or one controversy. A framework that treats isolated performance as decisive will quickly become unjust, manipulable, and morally unserious. IQ, like MQ, must concern itself with recurrent patterns. The proper object is durable public reasoning, not the fragment detached from time and context.

That principle allows for error, growth, correction, fatigue, inconsistency, and human variability. It also protects the framework from becoming merely another instrument of spectacle.

6. The Independence of MQ and IQ

6.1. Why They Cannot Be Collapsed

MQ and IQ are distinct because moral quality and cognitive quality are distinct. A person may treat others with evident respect while reasoning poorly. Another may reason with impressive structure while treating truth, dignity, and restraint as disposable. These are not the same deficiency, and should not be described as though they were.

The temptation to collapse the two is understandable. People often assume that moral seriousness implies intellectual seriousness, or that intelligence must carry moral weight simply because it is rare or powerful. Yet experience teaches otherwise. The public sphere contains too many examples of decency without discipline and brilliance without conscience to permit such simplifications.

6.2. Moral Seriousness Without Cognitive Strength

There are forms of public expression that are clearly well-intentioned and morally constructive in tone, yet cognitively weak. A speaker may reject cruelty, show fairness, and seek honest discourse, while still relying on loose analogy, shallow evidence, conceptual vagueness, or poorly formed arguments. The weakness here is not malicious. It may even coexist with admirable restraint. But it matters. Goodwill alone cannot stabilize public reasoning.

A society unable to name this pattern will tend to confuse sincerity with soundness. It will praise moral attitude while leaving intellectual weakness unexamined, even when that weakness contributes to confusion in practice.

6.3. Cognitive Sophistication Without Moral Restraint

The opposite pattern is among the most dangerous in public life: intelligence used without moral discipline. Here belong the manipulator, the rhetorically agile cynic, the intellectually gifted distorting mind, the strategist who understands structure deeply enough to weaponize it against truth, dignity, or fairness. Such persons are often admired precisely because their intelligence is visible. Yet that visibility can obscure the moral damage their intelligence is doing.

A one-dimensional public vocabulary is especially vulnerable here. If intelligence is praised in the abstract, cognitive sophistication can mask moral corrosion. If morality alone is discussed, the specific danger of capable intelligence in the service of degradation remains analytically blurred. The two-dimensional model is needed most urgently in precisely these cases.

6.4. When Both Fail Together

The most degraded public expressions often combine both forms of failure. Poor reasoning assists cruelty because confusion makes responsibility harder to assign. Cruelty assists poor reasoning because humiliation and tribal signaling can replace the labor of thought. Distortion becomes easier where dignity is absent; moral recklessness becomes more contagious where cognitive structure is weak.

This interaction helps explain why some public environments feel not merely noisy, but toxic. They are not suffering from one defect. They are suffering from the mutual reinforcement of two.

6.5. The Constructive Pole

The framework is not only diagnostic. It is also aspirational. High MQ and high IQ together describe a kind of public expression that is morally serious and cognitively serious at once: fair under disagreement, clear without simplification, rigorous without vanity, forceful without degradation, open to correction without surrendering structure. Such expression is rare enough to be worth naming carefully.

A framework that identifies corruption and weakness but cannot describe public excellence is incomplete. The present model seeks to do both.

7. Public Expression as a Two-Dimensional Space

7.1. From Single Scores to Position

A single score, even when useful, conceals structure. It forces different kinds of strength and weakness into one compressed summary. Yet public expression is often mixed. A statement may be morally strong and cognitively weak, or cognitively strong and morally weak. It may occupy a position that is informative precisely because it cannot be reduced to one line of evaluation.

The move from isolated ranking to structured position is therefore not cosmetic. It allows analysis to describe mixed cases without distortion. It also reduces the temptation to use a single evaluative term—smart, decent, dangerous, serious, respectable—as though it carried the whole burden of judgment.

7.2. MQ as Moral Axis, IQ as Cognitive Axis

The simplest way to conceptualize the framework is as a coordinate space for public expression. MQ functions as the moral axis. IQ functions as the cognitive axis. Each visible act or pattern of expression may then be understood as occupying a position within that space. The point of the metaphor is not mathematical elegance for its own sake. It is structural clarity.

Once public expression is treated in this way, many familiar confusions become easier to resolve. One can distinguish moral from cognitive strength, examine their interaction, and describe public discourse with greater fidelity than current labels allow.

Once public expression is understood as occupying a two-dimensional evaluative space, the next conceptual step becomes almost unavoidable. The framework can now be visualized not merely as two parallel measures, but as a mapped field in which distinct forms of public expression occupy different positions. The simplest version of such a map is a four-quadrant model formed by the intersection of MQ and IQ. Though necessarily schematic, this visual structure is useful because it makes immediately visible a central claim of the present paper: moral quality and cognitive quality may reinforce one another, diverge from one another, or fail together. The quadrants therefore do not replace analysis. They provide its first visual grammar.




Figure 2. Four-quadrant conceptual map of public expression based on Moral Quotient (MQ) and Intellectual Quotient (IQ).

The figure illustrates the simplest positional structure generated by the two-dimensional framework: public expression may be morally and cognitively strong, morally strong but cognitively weak, cognitively strong but morally weak, or weak in both dimensions. The model is schematic and interpretive, intended to clarify the interaction and independence of the two axes rather than to reduce expression to fixed categories.

7.3. What the Model Clarifies

Most current public categories are flattening devices. Ideological labels compress moral and cognitive differences into tribe. Popularity labels compress quality into attention. Credibility labels compress complexity into institutional reassurance. Even the label “intelligent” often compresses style, fluency, aggression, novelty, and status into one impressionistic verdict.

A coordinate model resists such flattening. Two speakers may be equally influential yet occupy very different positions in moral and cognitive space. Two statements may be equally popular yet differ radically in structure and conduct. The value of the model lies precisely in preserving distinctions that the present public sphere habitually erases.

7.4. The Value of Positional Analysis

Once expression is treated positionally, several analytical possibilities open. One can compare recurrent styles of discourse without pretending they are all defective in the same way. One can identify clusters of public behavior, mixed strengths, or distinctive combinations of cognitive power and moral weakness.

One can later imagine voluntary filtering, self-audit, or comparative media analysis built upon these distinctions.

These possibilities matter not because the framework should become a machine too quickly, but because the presence of structure makes further development possible without conceptual confusion.

7.5. A Later Visual Development

The coordinate logic naturally invites a later visual mapping of the space, including quadrants and more refined positional analysis. But that belongs to a later stage. The task of the present paper is more basic. It is to establish that such a space exists conceptually, that its two axes are defensible, and that public expression can be understood more adequately once they are admitted.

8. Why the Present Information Environment Requires This Framework

8.1. From Editorial Friction to Algorithmic Amplification

Earlier media systems were far from pure. They excluded good along with bad, carried their own biases, and often reflected the distortions of the institutions controlling them. Yet they also possessed friction. Content passed through visible mechanisms of mediation: editorial review, reputational risk, slower publication cycles, and socially legible boundaries between the respectable and the disreputable. Those systems did not eliminate corruption, but they often limited its automatic spread.

The contemporary media environment operates differently. Social platforms have democratized publication while weakening filtration. They reward speed, reaction, emotional force, imitation, and shareability. The result is not merely more speech. It is a different ecology of amplification, one that is often hospitable both to moral corrosion and to cognitive degradation. What spreads most efficiently is not always what is truest, kindest, clearest, or most disciplined. Very often it is what activates fastest.

8.2. Two Coupled Failures

In such an environment, moral and cognitive failure frequently reinforce one another. Expressions that humiliate, degrade, or provoke tend also to simplify aggressively, flatten nuance, and reward certainty over discipline. Expressions that are cognitively weak but emotionally potent become easier vehicles for moral recklessness. Conversely, morally corrosive actors often exploit cognitive shortcuts precisely because confusion is easier to scale than clarity.

The need for a dual framework therefore arises not from abstract conceptual neatness, but from the actual character of the present media sphere. The environment itself is producing mixed failures that require mixed description.

8.3. Systems That Reward Noise Over Structure

Attention-driven systems are not neutral toward content. They tend to privilege speed over thought, activation over proportion, confidence over discipline, and emotional friction over conceptual clarity. The result is not that every amplified statement is bad, but that the environment contains a structural bias in favor of what travels easily rather than what is well formed.

This matters because human beings learn from repeated reward. Public discourse teaches by amplification. If spectacle is rewarded, spectacle will be imitated. If aggression is rewarded, aggression will be normalized. If confusion can perform as intelligence, the habits of serious reasoning will weaken over time beneath the pressure of easier substitutes.

8.4. Why Existing Labels Are Too Thin

The labels most commonly available in public life are too blunt for this environment. A speaker may be called authentic, but authenticity tells us little about coherence. Another may be called expert, but expertise does not settle moral posture. One may be influential without being cognitively serious, or morally serious without being intellectually sound. The very vocabulary by which the public tries to orient itself has become too thin for the conditions it faces.

That is one reason a new framework is needed. The problem is not merely that bad things are happening. It is that the language available for describing them has become inadequate.

9. Why Numerical Expression Still Matters

9.1. The Case Against Purely Qualitative Judgment

Public life will always involve qualitative judgment. No score can abolish interpretation. Yet purely qualitative evaluation has limits, especially in environments of immense scale and speed. Human judgment is easily swayed by charisma, repetition, aesthetics, tribal loyalty, prestige, and emotional suggestion. What feels like intuitive discernment may in fact be a disguised response to style.

A structured numerical framework cannot eliminate these distortions, but it can force some discipline upon them. It can require named dimensions, relative weights, and explicit criteria where informal judgment would otherwise remain hidden and unaccountable.

9.2. Quantification Does Not Replace Judgment

The strongest argument for numerical expression is not that human reality can be reduced to arithmetic. It is that arithmetic, when used honestly, exposes the structure of judgments that would otherwise operate invisibly. Once criteria are named, once weights are disclosed, once examples are attached to outcomes, evaluative language becomes more inspectable and therefore more criticizable. This was already one of the central claims behind MQ, and it applies no less to the dual framework proposed here.

Quantification, in that sense, does not replace judgment. It compels judgment to show more of its work.

9.3. Explicit Criteria, Visible Weights, Contestable Output

Hidden ranking already dominates modern life. People are sorted by systems whose logic they do not see, judged by institutions whose criteria they cannot inspect, and filtered by social dynamics that act without accountability. Against that background, the argument for visible indices is not that numbers are pure, but that visibility is better than opacity.

A framework such as MQ and IQ would be defensible only if its dimensions were explicit, its methods inspectable, and its outputs contestable. That requirement is not technical detail. It is central to the moral legitimacy of the enterprise.

9.4. The Usefulness and Limits of Summary Scores

A score is never the whole truth. It cannot capture the full range of a person, nor even the full range of a public expression. Yet a score can still be useful as a disciplined summary of recurrent pattern, provided it remains subordinate to disclosed dimensions and contextual examples. The danger lies in false certainty. The value lies in explicitness.

A serious framework must therefore preserve both ambitions at once: enough structure to be useful, enough humility to remain honest.

10. Safeguards, Limits, and the Anti-Coercion Principle

10.1. Why the Dual Framework Is More Sensitive

The combination of moral and cognitive evaluation will trigger legitimate alarm. Even readers willing to entertain a moral framework may recoil once intelligence enters the picture, and not without reason. The modern world contains many examples of classification systems that drift toward domination. Any proposal that sounds as though it is measuring both morality and intellect must therefore proceed under stronger restraints, not weaker ones.

That sensitivity should not be treated as an obstacle to thought, but as a reason for greater care in framing and design.

10.2. The First Principle: No Coercive Use

The first principle is simple and non-negotiable. The IQ/MQ framework must not be used to allocate civic standing, rights, employment, credit, legality, or access to public life. It must not become an administrative instrument of the state, nor a hidden social passport enforced by institutions. No bank should decide loans by it. No employer should use it as a secret exclusion device. No government should turn it into civic rank.

Without this boundary, the framework would become too dangerous to defend. With it, the framework may remain within the domain of interpretation and voluntary selection.

10.3. Transparency

No morally and cognitively evaluative framework in this domain can claim legitimacy if it operates in secret. Its categories, dimensions, weights, and examples must be open to inspection. Black-box judgments about morality and intelligence would be worse than the disorder they seek to address. Transparency is therefore not a decorative value. It is a constitutive one.

10.4. Contestability

Human expression is contextual, unstable, and open to misreading. Quotations are detached from surrounding argument. Irony is flattened. Correction is ignored. Patterns are inferred too quickly. For these reasons, any serious framework must be contestable. A person should be able to inspect the basis of an interpretation and challenge it. If the framework cannot be argued with, it is not disciplined enough to be trusted.

10.5. Context

Public expression cannot be evaluated responsibly as isolated text fragments. Quotation, rebuttal, satire, repentance, revision, and temporal development all matter. A sentence may be an endorsement or a criticism depending on its use. A harsh phrase may be a quotation under attack rather than a statement of belief. A person may correct a prior error in a way that materially alters the meaning of the larger pattern.

Context therefore belongs not at the margins of the framework, but at its core. Any evaluation severed from context becomes morally and cognitively unserious by the very standards the framework is trying to uphold.

10.6. Pattern Rather Than Incident

The framework must judge patterns rather than incidents. One controversial moment, however dramatic, cannot serve as a sufficient basis for moral or cognitive classification. Human beings misspeak, react emotionally, quote others badly, and sometimes learn. A framework built on isolated incidents will become a machine for spectacle rather than understanding.

Pattern protects the framework from the habits of the platform age: the clipped fragment, the viral outrage, the single statement inflated into a total verdict. It is one of the framework's most important safeguards, and it follows directly from the same logic used in MQ.

10.7. Resistance to Ideological Capture

Any evaluative system touching morality and intelligence risks being captured by faction. One tribe will try to define morality as loyalty to itself; another will define intelligence as agreement with its assumptions. A serious framework must resist both temptations. Its dimensions must be described in as cross-tribal and non-sectarian a form as possible. It must distinguish disciplined dissent from incoherence, moral seriousness from ideological conformity, and originality from empty provocation.

This resistance can never be perfect. But without it, the framework would collapse into partisan instrumentality.

10.8. Interpretation Without Administration

The difference between interpretive use and administrative use must be preserved with special care. A person may legitimately wish to understand the public moral and cognitive environment he is inhabiting, or to filter what enters his own informational life. That is different from a system of institutions governing access, rights, and status by such criteria. The first belongs to voluntary orientation. The second belongs to coercive order.

The distinction may seem formal, but it is morally decisive. The framework proposed here belongs only to the first domain.

11. The Difficult Boundary Question: Expression and the Person

11.1. Why the Question Cannot Be Avoided

The present framework is deliberately grounded in public expression because that is the most defensible observational domain. Yet the link between recurrent public expression and the person expressing it cannot simply be denied. Society already makes such inferences constantly. We infer seriousness, reliability, character, judgment, and temperament from repeated public behavior all the time. The question is not whether that happens. It is whether it can be done more carefully.

A person who repeatedly lies in public, excuses cruelty in public, or reasons with chronic bad faith in public cannot forever be treated as though those repeated expressions have no relation to who he is. The same is true, in a more constructive direction, of someone whose public conduct repeatedly shows fairness, clarity, proportionality, and discipline.

11.2. The Case for Caution

At the same time, caution is essential. Public expression is not the whole person. Human beings contain contradiction, private struggle, change, context, performance, fear, vanity, and growth. Some are better in private than in public. Some perform wisdom they do not possess. Some mature. Some break. Some repent. Any framework that forgets this becomes philosophically crude and morally dangerous.

The present paper therefore refuses to collapse public pattern into essence. It does not claim that recurrent expression exhausts identity. It claims something narrower: that recurrent public expression can justify limited inference about disposition, while never eliminating incompleteness.

11.3. The Case Against Total Separation

Yet radical separation is no solution. To say that public expression reveals nothing meaningful about the person is implausible. Over time, what one repeatedly chooses to affirm, distort, excuse, celebrate, or refine in public becomes evidence of stable tendencies. Not certainty. Not total knowledge. But evidence.

Modern discourse often oscillates between two extremes: reduction, in which a person becomes one utterance, and denial, in which even repeated patterns are treated as morally and cognitively meaningless. Both are evasions. The first denies complexity. The second denies continuity.

11.4. From Public Pattern to Dispositional Inference

A more defensible position lies between them. Recurrent public expression may justify cautious, probabilistic, and revisable inference about tendencies of mind and moral posture. One may infer that a person repeatedly shows a weak relationship to evidence, or a strong propensity for humiliation, or a durable habit of clarification under challenge. These are not metaphysical verdicts. They are structured inferences from pattern.

Such inferences should remain modest in tone and limited in scope. But they need not be forbidden simply because they touch the person. Public behavior is one of the ways persons become known to others. A framework that cannot admit even that much will become unreal.

11.5. Why This Extension Remains Secondary Here

Even so, the present project must keep proportion. Its primary task is to build a two-dimensional evaluative framework for public expression. The broader anthropological question—how far visible public pattern can be extended into judgment about the person—should appear here only as a secondary and carefully bounded issue. It matters, but it does not belong at the center.

That placement is not a retreat. It is structural discipline. The framework must first establish its public object clearly before its human implications are explored more deeply.

12. Why Avoidance Is Not Neutral

12.1. The Modern Fear of Evaluating Persons

Modern societies are understandably wary of attempts to evaluate persons in structured moral or cognitive terms. History offers too many examples of classification systems becoming tools of exclusion, domination, humiliation, or pseudo-scientific hierarchy. Suspicion is therefore not merely fashionable. It has roots in real danger.

Any serious framework must acknowledge this. The fear is not irrational. It is one of the conditions under which the present proposal must be judged.

12.2. The Cost of Silence

Yet avoidance has a cost. Human beings and institutions do not stop judging when they stop speaking explicitly about judgment. They continue to sort, exclude, trust, distrust, elevate, and marginalize, but

they do so through hidden criteria, tribal cues, aesthetic impressions, prestige signals, and private bias. The public sphere is already full of unspoken evaluations. What is missing is not judgment but disciplined language.

Silence, in this domain, often protects opacity rather than fairness. The refusal to articulate evaluative standards does not produce neutrality. It merely leaves existing judgments less visible and less accountable.

12.3. Difficult Subjects Require Better Thought

The answer to a difficult subject is not automatic retreat. It is greater precision, stronger safeguards, clearer distinctions, and more disciplined reasoning. Mature thought does not avoid dangerous questions merely because they are dangerous. It seeks terms in which they can be handled more responsibly than they have been handled before.

That is the spirit in which the present framework is offered. Not as a declaration that the risks are trivial, but as a claim that fear alone is not a sufficient public philosophy.

13. Objections and Replies

13.1. “This Is Just Social Scoring”

The objection is understandable because the language of quotients and indices sounds close to systems of social ranking. Yet the resemblance is partial and potentially misleading. Coercive social scoring attaches institutional consequences to evaluative classifications. The present framework explicitly rejects such use. It is limited to public expression, designed for transparent and contestable interpretation, and directed toward voluntary analysis and later private filtering rather than civic consequence.

The difference is not cosmetic. It is structural. A tool of interpretation becomes a tool of domination only when it is linked to rights, access, or penalties. That linkage is exactly what the framework rejects.

13.2. “This Reduces Human Beings to Numbers”

A number can certainly be abused as a false totality. But the alternative is not always richer humanity. Often it is simply cruder compression performed informally through reputation, tribe, aesthetics, and emotional shorthand. A disciplined index, when properly constrained, may actually reduce false certainty by requiring visible dimensions and contextual examples rather than relying on unanalyzed impression.

The framework does not claim that a score is the person. It claims only that structured numerical summaries can be useful when they remain subordinate to patterns, dimensions, and contestable interpretation.

13.3. “This Confuses Intelligence with Agreement”

This objection would be devastating if true. But it is precisely what the framework must avoid. IQ, as proposed here, concerns clarity, coherence, evidence handling, proportionality, and discipline under challenge. None of these requires ideological conformity. A heterodox thinker may score high if he reasons well. A fashionable conformist may score low if he relies on slogans, contradiction, and prestige rather than structure.

In fact, one of the framework's strengths may be that it helps distinguish serious dissent from noisy provocation, a distinction that public life often handles badly.

13.4. "This Moralizes Disagreement"

The framework does not condemn disagreement as such. Disagreement is necessary to public thought. MQ concerns the moral manner in which disagreement is conducted: whether opponents are represented fairly, whether truth matters, whether dignity is preserved, whether harm is sought or restrained. It is entirely possible to disagree fiercely while remaining morally serious.

The public sphere already moralizes disagreement in chaotic ways. The present proposal attempts to replace some of that chaos with clearer distinctions.

13.5. "This Can Be Politically Weaponized"

Yes. Any serious evaluative language can be weaponized. The answer is not denial but design. That is why transparency, contestability, contextual sensitivity, pattern over incident, resistance to ideological capture, and the prohibition on coercive use are not optional refinements. They are part of the framework's legitimacy.

A framework that ignored the risk of weaponization would be naïve. One that acknowledges the risk and builds against it may at least deserve serious consideration.

13.6. "This Punishes Originality and Heterodoxy"

A badly designed framework would do so. A better one should do the opposite. The point is not to reward conformity. It is to distinguish disciplined originality from incoherent noise, and morally serious dissent from theatrical provocation. Public life badly needs that distinction. Much mediocrity disguises itself as rebellion, and much serious dissent is dismissed because the available language cannot separate structure from mere disruption.

If the framework cannot protect heterodoxy, it has failed cognitively as well as morally.

14. The Place of This Paper in a Three-Paper Project

14.1. Paper I: MQ as a Stand-Alone Moral Framework

The first paper in this sequence proposed MQ as a stand-alone framework for evaluating the moral quality of observable public behavior. It defined its domain, clarified its limits, identified candidate dimensions, and argued that moral evaluation in the public sphere could be made more explicit without becoming coercive. That paper was intentionally confined to one axis so that the moral problem could be seen clearly on its own terms.

14.2. Paper II: The Combined Framework

The present paper constitutes the second stage of the project. Its role is not primarily applied, but conceptual. It defines the second dimension, explains why moral and cognitive quality must be treated as distinct, and proposes a two-dimensional framework within which public expression may be located and analyzed. In that sense, it is both an extension and a stabilization of the larger architecture.

14.3. Paper III: The IQ/MQ Filter

A later paper may address the practical question of what it would mean to build a private IQ/MQ filtering system. That next stage would concern user-controlled thresholds, interface logic, application

modes, explanatory mechanisms, and voluntary informational selection. It would belong to the domain of navigation rather than theory.

The distinction matters. One should not confuse the present paper's conceptual task with the later question of implementation.

14.4. From Framework to Navigation

The movement from Paper I to Paper II to Paper III follows a coherent logic. First, define a moral dimension. Second, define a combined evaluative space. Third, consider what it means to use such a space for private informational orientation. Without the second step, the third would be conceptually thin. Without the first, the second would lack foundation.

The present paper therefore occupies the necessary middle position. It turns an isolated moral proposal into a broader language for evaluating public expression.

15. Conclusion: Toward a More Structured Understanding of Public Expression

15.1. Two Visible Failures

The public information environment is degraded not only by moral corrosion, but by cognitive corrosion. It suffers not only from dishonesty, humiliation, manipulation, and reckless conduct, but from confusion, structural weakness, pseudo-argument, inflated certainty, and the simulation of thought. These are distinct failures, though they often reinforce one another.

Any framework serious enough to confront the quality of public expression must therefore be able to see both.

15.2. A More Adequate Framework

MQ and IQ, taken together, define a more disciplined way of describing what public expression is doing. MQ addresses the moral character of visible public conduct. IQ addresses the cognitive quality of visible public reasoning. Together they provide a two-dimensional analytical framework that is more adequate than the dominant public substitutes of popularity, virality, prestige, ideological tribe, or surface credibility.

The gain here is not perfection. It is structure.

15.3. The Danger of the Framework

The framework is not harmless by definition. It can be distorted, overclaimed, bureaucratized, weaponized, or mistaken for a machine of total knowledge. These dangers are real. They must be named plainly. Any honest presentation of the framework must admit that the formalization of evaluative language creates risks along with benefits.

That admission is not a weakness of the project. It is part of its seriousness.

15.4. The Danger of Refusing the Framework

Yet the refusal to construct evaluative language carries danger as well. A society that will measure everything except what matters most does not become free of ranking. It becomes subject to cruder rankings: louder ones, less visible ones, more tribal ones, and less accountable ones. Public life is already sorted by systems of attention, prestige, emotion, and hidden judgment. The absence of disciplined language does not end evaluation. It merely abandons it to worse masters.

15.5. A Final Position

The purpose of this paper is not to score souls. It is not to convert public life into a tribunal of quantified virtue and quantified intellect. It is to propose that public expression leaves more than one visible trace, and that those traces may be described with greater clarity than the present information environment usually allows. Over time, what a society amplifies becomes part of what it becomes. For that reason, the question is not only who is heard, but what kind of moral and cognitive pattern is being rewarded when they are.

A framework such as MQ and IQ cannot solve that problem by itself. But it may help name it more honestly. And in an age increasingly shaped by amplification rather than judgment, more honest naming is not a small beginning.

Appendix A. Preliminary Comparison of MQ and IQ Dimensions

MQ and IQ are parallel in structure but distinct in object. Both concern visible public behavior. Both seek recurrent pattern rather than isolated incident. Both are designed to be interpretive rather than coercive. Yet the questions they ask are different.

MQ asks whether truth is treated as a duty toward others. IQ asks whether truth is treated as a cognitive discipline. The first concerns honesty, fairness, and moral seriousness in relation to public life. The second concerns whether claims are structured, supported, and proportionate. A person may fail either dimension while appearing strong in the other. One may respect the other as a person while still reasoning badly. One may reason with formidable precision while treating truth as a tool rather than a norm.

MQ asks how disagreement is conducted morally. Does the speaker humiliate, caricature, dehumanize, or incite? IQ asks how disagreement is conducted cognitively. Does the speaker refine, clarify, and respond to substance, or evade, inflate, and substitute tone for argument? In the first case the concern is dignity and restraint. In the second the concern is structure and thought.

MQ asks whether influence is used responsibly. IQ asks whether influence is exercised through sound reasoning or through simulations of thought. One dimension tracks moral responsibility under reach. The other tracks cognitive seriousness under reach. These concerns are related because influence magnifies both moral and cognitive failure. Yet they remain distinguishable.

MQ asks whether principles are applied consistently across allies and opponents. IQ asks whether claims are scaled consistently to evidence and whether contradictions are confronted rather than ignored. Here the two dimensions approach one another closely. Both concern forms of integrity. But one is moral integrity in the treatment of others and of norms. The other is cognitive integrity in the treatment of claims and reasons.

The practical value of distinguishing the two lies precisely in those cases where they diverge. Without MQ, high intelligence may conceal moral damage. Without IQ, moral sincerity may conceal public confusion. Together they offer a richer and more disciplined account of visible expression than either could alone.

Appendix B. Conceptual Examples of IQ/MQ Divergence

Consider first a speaker whose public conduct is decent, measured, and free of humiliation, but whose reasoning is chronically weak. He treats opponents fairly, does not incite cruelty, and attempts to remain honest. Yet he relies on loose association, anecdotal overreach, selective support, and vague conceptual boundaries. Such a speaker may occupy a relatively high moral position and a relatively weak cognitive one. The value of the framework is not to condemn him wholesale, but to describe his strength and weakness without collapsing them into one blurred verdict.

Consider next a speaker who reasons with speed, structure, and strategic depth, yet repeatedly uses that intelligence to distort, manipulate, excuse degradation, or intensify tribal malice. Such a figure may occupy a high cognitive position and a low moral one. Public life often finds this type especially difficult to judge because visible intelligence attracts admiration even when its ends are corrosive. The two-dimensional framework allows that danger to be named more precisely.

A third case is the speaker low on both dimensions. He is careless with evidence, inflated in claim, resistant to correction, and morally reckless in the treatment of opponents. Here confusion and degradation reinforce one another. Such expression is not merely mistaken. It becomes socially polluting, teaching both bad thought and bad conduct at once.

Finally, one may imagine a speaker high on both dimensions. He reasons with structure, handles evidence honestly, clarifies under challenge, and preserves dignity even in serious disagreement. This case matters because the framework is not only a diagnostic instrument for decline. It also identifies the kind of public expression that deserves preference in a healthier information environment.

These examples are conceptual rather than numerical. Their purpose is to illustrate that the framework gains explanatory power precisely when it resists one-dimensional compression.

Appendix C. Notes Toward a Future IQ/MQ Filtering Architecture

If the two-dimensional framework remains only a philosophical proposal, it may still have value as language. But its fuller practical significance emerges when one imagines a later system of voluntary private use. Such a system would not attempt to govern public rights or impose institutional penalties. Its purpose would be narrower: to help individuals understand and shape the moral and cognitive character of what enters their own informational life.

A future IQ/MQ filtering system would need to preserve all the safeguards articulated in this paper. It would have to remain transparent in its criteria, contestable in its outputs, contextual in interpretation, and limited to public content. It would need to show not only summary scores or bands, but also the dimensions contributing to them and representative examples of the relevant patterns. Without that visibility, a filtering system would become morally and cognitively untrustworthy by its own standards.

The proposed filtering system would also need to be user-controlled. Different users might set different thresholds or preferences depending on whether they are seeking maximal openness, stricter moral filtration, stricter cognitive filtration, or some balanced combination. One person might tolerate sharp moral disagreement but refuse cognitive sloppiness. Another might allow a broader range of cognitive styles while refusing repeated humiliation or cruelty. The purpose of the filter would not be to decide universally what all citizens must hear. It would be to allow individuals to shape their own exposure more consciously.

The challenge of such a system would lie not only in technical implementation, but in explanation. A meaningful filter cannot operate as a hidden gate. It must justify its outputs in terms users can inspect and question. In that sense, the future architecture would remain an extension of the present paper's central principle: structured judgment is preferable to hidden judgment only when it is willing to show its work.

At its best, such a filter would not act as a censor, a tribunal, or a social passport. It would act as a user-directed lens on public expression, helping people decide what kinds of recurrent moral and cognitive patterns they are willing to invite into their daily informational environment. That later possibility belongs to the third paper in the present sequence. It is mentioned here only to show that the conceptual work of the current paper is not abstract for its own sake. It prepares the ground for a practical question that cannot be asked coherently until the two-dimensional framework has first been made clear.

About the Author

Lev Neymotin, PhD, is the founder of *Uncompressed Thinking*, an independent research and communication initiative focused on developing structured frameworks at the intersection of science, technology, and public discourse. His work explores how complex systems—ranging from physical phenomena to information environments—can be understood through disciplined conceptual models that remain accessible without loss of depth. His recent work includes the development of Moral Quotient (MQ) and Intellectual Quotient (IQ) as evaluative frameworks for public expression.