



Rewiring the Global Economy
*Interdependence, Strategic Reform,
and the Trump Experiment*

Lev Neymotin, PhD
Uncompressed Thinking

A Question That Reveals the System

A useful way to begin thinking about the structure of the global economy is to pose a deliberately unsettling question:

If the three principal economic centers of the modern world — the United States, China, and Europe — were suddenly forced into sudden and complete economic isolation, which of them would suffer the most?

At first glance the question may appear hypothetical, yet answering it reveals something essential about the structure of the global economic system itself.

At first glance the answer may seem straightforward. Yet the reality is far more complex. Each of these economies depends on the others in different and often invisible ways: China on external markets and advanced technologies, Europe on imported energy, materials, and digital infrastructure, and the United States on globally distributed manufacturing capacity and supply networks. My preliminary assessment is that **Europe would likely face the most immediate structural shock**, China would endure severe disruption but retain a powerful industrial base for adaptation, and the United States—though hardly immune—would probably remain the most internally self-sufficient.

This essay uses that question not as a prediction exercise, but as a lens through which we can better understand the architecture of the current global economic system—and why it has entered a period of fundamental reorganization.

For several decades the global economy functioned under an arrangement that was never formally negotiated but gradually came to be treated as natural. Manufacturing concentrated in China, high-precision industry and regulatory influence remained centered in Europe, and the United States supplied the financial architecture and technological platforms through which global commerce operated. The system generated extraordinary growth, yet it also created deep structural dependencies that proved increasingly difficult to manage politically and economically. Those dependencies have now reached a point where the original arrangement no longer provides stability.

What we are witnessing today in rising trade tensions, alliance frictions, and strategic competition is therefore not merely another cycle of international disputes, but the early stage of a structural reorganization of the global economic order.

Executive Summary

The modern international economic system developed over several decades around a triangular structure linking the United States, Europe, and China. Within this structure, each region assumed a distinct role in the global production system. China became the world's principal center of large-scale manufacturing, Europe concentrated on high-precision industrial production and regulatory governance, and the United States provided the financial architecture and technological platforms that supported global commerce.

This distribution of roles proved highly productive. It enabled rapid industrial expansion, deepened international trade, and contributed to one of the most dynamic periods of global economic growth in modern history. Yet the same specialization that created efficiency also generated structural dependencies among the three major economic centers. Europe became dependent on imported energy, raw materials, and digital infrastructure. China developed a manufacturing system deeply tied to foreign markets and external technological inputs. The United States, while retaining leadership in finance and advanced technologies, experienced growing political pressure from persistent trade imbalances and industrial dislocation.

Over time, these asymmetries transformed economic interdependence into a system containing significant strategic vulnerabilities. Relationships that were originally designed to maximize efficiency increasingly began to function as potential instruments of political leverage. As a result, the global economic order that emerged at the end of the Cold War has gradually reached the limits of its previous equilibrium.

Recent tensions in international trade and geopolitical relations should therefore be understood not simply as episodic disputes but as part of a broader process of systemic adjustment. The policies of the Trump administration—particularly its emphasis on trade renegotiation, tariff pressure, and greater economic responsibility among major partners—can be interpreted as an effort to test whether the existing system of interdependence can be rebalanced into a more sustainable configuration.

These efforts are necessarily experimental and controversial, yet they reflect a growing recognition that the previous arrangement can no longer remain unchanged. Artificial intelligence and other emerging technologies further complicate the transition by reshaping productivity patterns and labor markets across many sectors, although they should be viewed primarily as accelerating factors rather than the root cause of the present transformation.

The central argument of this essay is that the world has entered a period of **reorganization of the global economic order**. The challenge facing policymakers is not to abandon interdependence but to redesign it in ways that reduce structural vulnerabilities, promote reciprocity among major economic actors, and preserve the stability necessary for continued global prosperity.

How the Global Economic Order Took Shape

For nearly half a century the international economy operated under an implicit arrangement that appeared remarkably productive. China provided manufacturing scale, Europe refined high-value industrial production and regulatory structure, and the United States supplied the financial and

technological infrastructure through which global commerce functioned. What emerged was not a formally designed system but a practical distribution of roles that gradually stabilized into the dominant pattern of globalization.

For many years this arrangement worked exceptionally well. Global production expanded, international trade deepened, and the world economy experienced one of the most dynamic periods of growth in modern history. Each participant benefited in its own way: China accelerated industrialization, Europe sustained its leadership in advanced manufacturing, and the United States consolidated its position at the center of global finance and technological innovation.

Yet systems that operate successfully for long periods often accumulate internal tensions that remain invisible until circumstances begin to change. Over time, the same specialization that produced efficiency also created structural dependencies that proved increasingly difficult to manage. Europe's industrial strength came to rely heavily on imported energy and materials. China's manufacturing ecosystem became deeply tied to foreign markets and technological inputs. The United States, while maintaining leadership in finance and technology, faced growing political pressure from trade imbalances and industrial dislocation.

What once appeared as a stable distribution of economic roles gradually evolved into a system in which each major participant depended on critical inputs controlled by the others. In such a system, economic interdependence can easily transform from a source of prosperity into a source of strategic vulnerability.

The tensions visible in international politics today reflect this deeper structural reality. Trade disputes, tariff conflicts, and alliance frictions are not isolated events but symptoms of a system that has reached the limits of its previous equilibrium. The question facing policymakers is therefore not whether the existing order will change, but **how it will be reorganized** in order to restore stability while preserving the benefits of international cooperation.

The policies pursued by the Trump administration can be interpreted within this broader context. Rather than viewing them solely as individual political initiatives, it is possible to see them as part of an ongoing experiment aimed at reshaping the rules of economic interdependence among the major centers of global power. Whether these efforts ultimately succeed will depend on how effectively they address the underlying structural imbalances of the current system.

Artificial intelligence and related technological advances add further complexity to this process by reshaping productivity and labor markets across many sectors of the economy. However, these technologies should be understood primarily as complicating factors that accelerate existing pressures rather than the fundamental cause of the present transformation.

The deeper driver remains structural. The global economic order that emerged in the late twentieth century delivered extraordinary prosperity, but it has now reached a stage where **reform and reorganization are becoming unavoidable**. This essay explores the nature of that transition and considers how a more stable framework of international economic interaction might eventually emerge.

The Architecture of the Existing Global Economic System

The modern global economy is often described as a network of trade relationships among sovereign states. In reality it functions more accurately as an integrated production system whose components are geographically distributed.

Manufacturing, design, logistics, financing, software infrastructure, and resource extraction are rarely located within the same national boundaries. Instead, these elements are dispersed across continents and connected through complex supply chains. What appears as international trade is often merely the visible surface of a much deeper structure of economic cooperation.

Within this structure, three regions assumed particularly important roles.

China developed the world's most extensive manufacturing ecosystem. The country's industrial clusters, supplier networks, and logistical infrastructure allow companies to move rapidly from design to mass production. This manufacturing density became one of the defining economic advantages of the early twenty-first century.

Europe maintained leadership in advanced industrial sectors such as machinery, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, aerospace, and high-end automotive production. European firms also became influential in shaping regulatory standards that govern large portions of the global marketplace.

The United States emerged as the central platform of the global economic system. Its financial markets, the international role of the dollar, and its leadership in software, cloud computing, and advanced technologies provided the infrastructure through which much of the world economy operates.

Together these three regions formed a triangular structure that powered global growth for decades.

However, the same specialization that generated efficiency also created **structural imbalances** that gradually became more difficult to manage.

Structural Dependencies Within the Triangle

The interdependence within the global economic triangle is not symmetrical. Each of the three major economic centers depends on the others in different ways and to different degrees. Understanding the nature of these dependencies is essential for evaluating how resilient each system would be under conditions of sudden disruption.

The most important characteristic of the global economic triangle is not simply trade volume but **asymmetric dependence**.

China

China's economic model depends heavily on global markets and international supply chains. Its manufacturing system is extraordinarily powerful and deeply integrated, yet its growth historically relied on continued access to foreign technology, advanced semiconductor ecosystems, and external demand for manufactured goods. China possesses industrial depth but remains tied to international technological and commercial networks.

United States

The United States occupies a different structural position. It retains large internal markets, abundant natural resources, and leadership in key technological sectors such as software, semiconductors, and advanced research. At the same time, decades of globalization shifted significant portions of mass manufacturing abroad, creating supply-chain dependencies that have become politically visible in recent years.

Europe

Europe's economic strength lies in sophisticated industrial production and technological refinement. Yet its system relies heavily on imported energy, raw materials, and external digital infrastructure. Many of the foundational technologies that support European industry—including cloud platforms, advanced semiconductor design, and global financial infrastructure—originate largely outside Europe. As a result, Europe's economic system is deeply integrated into external networks for both physical resources and digital capabilities.

These structural relationships mean that none of the three actors is fully independent. Each relies on inputs controlled by the others. Under stable conditions this interdependence promotes cooperation. Under political stress it creates the potential for economic pressure.

This dynamic—often described as **coercive interdependence**—has become increasingly visible in recent years.

These observations allow a simple comparative conclusion about the resilience of the three systems under conditions of sudden disruption.

This asymmetric structure suggests that although the three actors are deeply interdependent, their resilience under conditions of disruption would not be identical. Europe's reliance on imported energy, raw materials, and externally developed digital infrastructure would likely expose it to the most immediate structural shock. China would experience severe disruption but would retain a powerful industrial base capable of gradual adaptation. The United States, while far from immune to disruption, would likely preserve the broadest margin of strategic autonomy.

Political Systems and Economic Interaction

An additional nuance that deserves careful consideration is the difference in political systems within the triangle.

The United States and Europe operate within democratic political frameworks characterized by pluralistic decision-making, electoral accountability, and institutional constraints. Economic policy in these systems often evolves slowly because it must navigate competing political interests and legal structures.

China operates under a different political model. Its centralized governance allows the state to coordinate industrial policy, infrastructure investment, and technological development with greater speed and continuity than most democratic systems can achieve.

These differences do not automatically make cooperation impossible, but they do influence how economic interdependence functions. Democracies tend to prioritize transparency, reciprocal access,

and legal predictability. Authoritarian systems may emphasize strategic autonomy and state-directed development.

When these models interact within a tightly integrated economic system, tensions can emerge regarding market access, technology transfer, and the role of the state in economic competition.

Understanding this institutional contrast helps explain why the global economic system increasingly requires **explicit rules and negotiated structures** rather than relying solely on market forces.

The Old Order and Its Limits

The globalization model that emerged after the Cold War rested on several implicit assumptions. First, it assumed that expanding trade would naturally balance itself over time through market adjustments. Second, it assumed that economic integration would gradually reduce geopolitical tensions. Third, it assumed that technological progress would continuously create new employment opportunities to replace those displaced by industrial relocation.

Over time, each of these assumptions became more difficult to sustain. Persistent trade imbalances created political pressure in many countries. Industrial dislocation generated social and regional inequalities that governments struggled to address. Strategic dependencies in critical sectors—energy, semiconductors, pharmaceuticals, and digital infrastructure—raised national security concerns.

The result was a growing perception that the global system had become **efficient but fragile**.

Artificial intelligence now adds another layer of uncertainty. By transforming productivity and reshaping labor demand across many sectors, AI complicates the already delicate balance between globalization and domestic stability. However, AI should be seen primarily as an accelerating force rather than the original cause of the system's instability.

The fundamental issue remains that the existing structure of global economic interdependence has reached a point where it requires **institutional redesign**.

Why the Previous System Became Politically Unsustainable

The structural tensions described above gradually translated into political pressures within each of the major economic centers. For several decades globalization expanded faster than the political systems responsible for managing its consequences. While the economic logic of the system emphasized efficiency and specialization, political stability depended on a broader set of considerations including employment distribution, regional development, and national security.

One of the most visible sources of pressure was the persistence of large and prolonged trade imbalances. The United States increasingly absorbed a disproportionate share of global consumption, while China developed a powerful export-oriented manufacturing base. Europe maintained a highly competitive industrial sector that generated substantial trade surpluses in key areas of advanced production. Although these imbalances were sustainable from a purely economic perspective, they gradually created political friction as voters and policymakers began to question whether the distribution of benefits within the system remained equitable.

Industrial dislocation compounded these tensions. The relocation of large segments of manufacturing capacity to lower-cost regions produced significant economic gains for the global system as a whole, yet the adjustment costs were unevenly distributed within national economies. Regions dependent on traditional manufacturing experienced long-term employment decline, while the benefits of globalization often accumulated in financial, technological, and metropolitan sectors. Political systems that had previously supported trade liberalization increasingly faced domestic pressure to address these imbalances.

A third factor contributing to the political fragility of the previous order was the growing recognition of strategic vulnerabilities embedded within global supply chains. The concentration of critical production capacity in specific geographic locations—particularly in sectors such as semiconductors, pharmaceuticals, rare earth elements, and energy infrastructure—introduced risks that were not fully appreciated during the early decades of globalization. What had been designed as an efficient global production network began to appear, under conditions of geopolitical tension, as a system capable of transmitting disruption across entire economies.

These pressures did not emerge simultaneously, nor did they produce immediate policy shifts. For many years governments attempted to address the resulting tensions through incremental adjustments within the existing framework of globalization. Over time, however, it became increasingly clear that the previous arrangement relied on political assumptions that were becoming progressively more difficult to sustain.

The system itself had not failed in the traditional sense. On the contrary, it had delivered remarkable economic expansion and technological progress. Yet the distribution of responsibilities and vulnerabilities within the triangular relationship among the United States, Europe, and China had gradually moved beyond the point where it could be maintained indefinitely without significant reform.

By the late 2010s, the accumulated political pressures within the major economic centers were beginning to converge. It was within this environment that more explicit attempts to renegotiate the structure of global economic relationships began to emerge.

The policies of the Trump administration should therefore be understood within this broader context: not merely as a set of isolated trade measures, but as part of a broader effort to test whether the existing system of interdependence could be restructured into a more balanced and politically sustainable form.

The Trump Administration's Strategic Experiment

Against this background, the international posture of the Trump administration appears less random than many commentators assume. Its policies can be interpreted as an effort to test whether a different configuration of global economic relations can be constructed.

Tariffs, trade renegotiations, and pressure on allies to increase defense spending all share a common objective: to rebalance the distribution of economic responsibilities within the international system. In effect, the administration is attempting to transform access to the American market, the American security umbrella, and the American financial system into negotiating tools for restructuring global economic relationships.

Critics often describe these policies as disruptive or transactional. Yet from a structural perspective they represent an attempt—however experimental—to address the accumulated imbalances of the previous order.

Whether every individual policy measure proves effective is less important than the broader strategic premise: that the old arrangement cannot continue indefinitely without reform.

Possible Paths of Systemic Transformation

The experimentation currently underway could lead to several different outcomes.

One possibility is the formation of competing economic blocs in which trade and technology networks become increasingly regionalized. This would reduce vulnerability to external shocks but would also diminish the efficiency that global integration once provided.

Another possibility is a gradual renegotiation of global economic relationships in which the major actors accept new expectations of reciprocity, industrial responsibility, and supply-chain diversification.

A third scenario involves the normalization of economic pressure as a tool of international politics. In such an environment, trade and financial networks become instruments of continuous strategic competition.

Each of these outcomes carries risks. Yet the second path—**managed rebalancing rather than fragmentation**—offers the greatest potential for long-term stability.

Toward a Governable System of Interdependence

If the goal is to create a more stable global economic order, several principles become essential.

Critical sectors of the global economy—energy systems, digital infrastructure, semiconductor supply chains, and essential medical production—must be designed with redundancy and resilience rather than maximum efficiency alone.

Reciprocity in market access and industrial policy must be clearly defined and enforceable. Without transparent rules, economic interdependence will continue to generate political mistrust.

Domestic economic stability must also be addressed. As technological change reshapes labor markets, governments will need to invest in education, workforce transition, and industrial development to maintain social cohesion.

Finally, alliances and security relationships should remain credible and durable even as trade relationships evolve. Stable security arrangements provide the political foundation upon which economic cooperation can function.

Conclusion: Reforming the International Economic Order

The turbulence currently visible in international politics should not be interpreted solely as conflict. It is more accurately understood as the early phase of a **structural reorganization of the global economic system**.

The triangular relationship among the United States, Europe, and China produced unprecedented prosperity, but it also created imbalances that can no longer be ignored. Reforming this system is therefore not optional; it has become a historical necessity.

The Trump administration's policies represent one attempt—experimental and controversial—to begin this process of reform. While the path forward remains uncertain, it is reasonable to expect that the ongoing search for a more balanced and sustainable arrangement will ultimately produce a new equilibrium.

Artificial intelligence and other emerging technologies will influence the shape of that equilibrium, but the central transformation is already underway: the world is moving from a period of unmanaged globalization toward a phase of **deliberately structured interdependence**.

If this transition succeeds, the result will not be the end of global cooperation but its renewal under clearer rules, more balanced responsibilities, and stronger foundations for long-term stability.